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Black and Hardy: California Law Survey

SURVEY: WOMEN AND
CALIFORNIA LAW
This survey of California law, a regular feature of
the Women's Law Forum, summarIzes recent
California Supreme Court and Court of Appeal
decisions of special importance to women. A brief
analysis of the issues pertinent to women raised
in each case is provided.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

CRIMINAL LAW

A.

B.

C.

II.

Sex Offenses
1. Refusal to grant probation to sex offender
because of lack of locally available rehabilitation program upheld . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
2. Defense of reasonable mistake not available to defendant charged with lewd or lascivious conduct with a child under the age
of fourteen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
3. Evidence that a victim is suffering from
rape trauma syndrome is not admissible
to prove that a rape has occurred. . . . . ..
Felony Child Abuse
1. Felony child abuse may not serve as the
underlying felony to support a conviction
of second degree murder under the felony
murder theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Child Stealing
1. Parent not guilty of child stealing where
reconciliation cancels an interlocutory
custody decree.........................

577

580

584

588

591

FAMILY LAW

A.

Community Property
575

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 4

576

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1.

Wife entitled to that portion of the husband's disability which represents her
share of community property interest in
his retirement benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 594

2.

Separate property of a spouse which is
converted to joint tenancy during the
marriage or is used to acquire joint tenancy property during marriage lS presumed to be community property . . . . . ..

3.

B.

A debt owed to a spouse as part of a property settlement agreement can be discharged in bankruptcy if it arises out of a
division of community property unrelated
to alimony, support, or maintenance
600

Putative spouse entitled to succeed to
share of decedent's separate property
604

Child Custody and Control
1.

Trial court must find that award of custody of a child to its natural father would
be detrimental to the child before it may
terminate natural father's custody rights. 607

2.

Discontinuation of visitation is in best interest of child where child has been sexually molested by lather. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

3.

III.

596

Decedent's Estates
1.

C.

[Vol. 15:575

614

Application of the term "convicted," as
found in the Civil Code, is limited to instances where there has been a final judgment ................................. 618

EMPLOYMENT LAW

A.

Employment Discrimination
1.

B.

Gender is not a bona fide occupational
qualification for a position as a cook in a
. 'l ............................ . 620
men ,s }al

Unemployment Insurance

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss3/4

2

Black and Hardy: California Law Survey

1985]

CALIFORNIA LAW SURVEY

1.

C.

IV.

623

Wrongful Discharge
1. Woman wrongfully discharged for dating
employee of her employer's competitor
625

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A.

I.

Employee who accompanies "non-marital
partner" voluntarily leaves work with
good cause within the meaning of the statute governing. eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits ............... ,

577

Equal Protection
1. A difference in rights accorded to mothers
and nonpresumed fathers does not violate
the equal protection clause of the California or U.S. Constitutions . ............. , 628

CRIMINAL LAW

A.

Sex Offenses
1.

Refusal to grant probation to sex offender because
of lack of locally available rehabilitation program
upheld.

People v. Lucero, 154 Cal. App. 3d 245, 201 Cal. Rptr. 99
(5th Dist. 1984). The court of appeal in People v. Lucero affirmed a trial court's denial of probation to a defendant who had
been found guilty of incest and lewd and lascivious acts with his
daughter while she was under the age of fourteen. l The court
held that the trial court's finding did not constitute an abuse of
discretion.

The father had been regularly sexually molesting his daughter since she was four years old. The daughter did not tell anyone about the incidents until she was sixteen years old. She testified that she had remained silent because her father had told
her that he would kill himself if she told anyone.
The father pleaded guilty to incest2 and lewd and lascivious
acts on a child under the age of fourteen. 3 Conflicting psycholog1.
2.
3.

CAL. PENAL CODE
CAL. PENAL CODE
CAL. PENAL CODE
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ical evaluations of the father were given at the hearing. He requested probation.
The court of appeal denied the father's request for probation under Penal Code section 1203.066. 4 This section provides
that probation will be denied to sex offenders who have engaged
in "substantial sexual conduct" with a victim under the age of
eleven years or who "occup[y] a position of special trust" in relation to the victim. II The section defines "position of special
trust" as "occupied by a person in a position of authority who by
reason of that position is able to exercise undue influence over
the victim. Position of authority includes, but is not limited to,
the position occupied by a natural parent . . . ."6
The defendant first contended that the information did not
properly charge him so as to bring him within the probation restrictions of section 1203.066. The court determined that the
"substantial sexual conduct" provision was satisfied because the
defendant had engaged in fondling, oral copulation and, eventually, sexual intercourse with his daughter before she had reached
majority. The court next rejected the father's argument that section 1203.066 required that the prosecution show that he was, in
fact, trusted by the victim. The court characterized this reading
of the section as "hypertechnical" and held that the only finding
needed to satisfy this provision was that the father was the natural father of the victim and that he and the victim resided in
the same household.
The father next contended that even if he was correctly
charged under section 1203.066, he should still have been
granted probation. He based this contention on section
1203.066(c)1 which provides that section 1203.066(a)(7), (8) and
(9) are inapplicable if the trial court makes the following four
findings:
(1) The defendant is the victim's natural parent
... who has lived in the household. (2) Imprisonment of the defendant is not in the best interest
of the child. (3) Rehabilitation of the defendant is
4. CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 1203.066 (West Supp. 1985).

5.Id.
6.Id.
7. CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 1203.066(c) (West Supp. 1985).
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feasible in a recognized treatment program
designed to deal with child molestation, and if the
defendant is to remain in the household, a program that is specifically designed to deal with molestation within the family. (4) There is no threat
of physical harm to the child victim if there is no
imprisonment. 8

The trial court found that there was no locally available recognized treatment center and that there existed a potential for
physical harm to the daughter if the father was not imprisoned.
The trial court also stated that even if the requirements of
1203.066(c) were met, the facts of this particular case would
make probation inappropriate. The court specifically noted the
long period of time during which the father carried on his conduct, the exceedingly vulnerable position of his victim and the
apparent premeditation of the father's conduct as reasons for
denial of probation in this case.
The court of appeal found that the trial court's ruling did
not constitute an abuse of discretion. The court emphasized that
the focus of such a decision should be on the availability of an
effective rehabilitation program and the relative safety of the
child.
The court of appeal declined to undertake an evidentiary
analysis of the trial court's exercise of discretion. The court may
have accorded the trial court a greater degree of discretion because the case involved a sex offense. This is especially apparent
regarding the trial court's finding that there was no local program dealing with child molestation. The court of appeal stated
that to qualify under section 1203.066, the treatment program
must "involve more than the availability of a psychologist or
psychiatrist dealing with the problems on an ad-hoc basis."
The court's restrictive construction of the statute on this
point may result in the incarceration of offenders when a more
constructive alternative is available. However, the trial court
found that even if there had been a qualified rehabilitation program, releasing the father in this case may have endangered the
daughter. The court of appeal's affirmation of the trial court's
8. [d.
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denial of probation is justified on this basis alone.
2. Defense of reasonable mistake not available to defendant charged with lewd or lascivious conduct
with a child under the age of fourteen.
People v. Olsen, 36 Cal. 3d 638, 685 P.2d 52, 205 Cal. Rptr.
492 (1984). The California Supreme Court in People v. Olsen
refused to allow a defense of reasonable mistake as to age in a
case under Penal Code section 288(a) involving lewd or lascivious conduct with a child under the age of fourteen. 9 The court
reasoned that Penal Code section 288 was enacted to further the
strong policy of protecting young children and that the enactment of Penal Code section 1203.066(a)(3)1° clearly indicated
that the defense of reasonable mistake of age was not to be
available. The court determined that recognizing such a defense
would render this section meaningless.

The female victim was fourteen years and ten months old at
the time of the incident. Because there were guests staying at
the family residence, the victim was spending nights in a trailer
parked in the driveway. The victim's father discovered the defendant and his codefendant in bed with the victim. The victim
testified that defendant had asked to enter the trailer. She
stated that she ignored him and went to sleep. She awoke to find
the codefendant holding a knife at her throat. Under the threat
of the knife, she engaged in sexual intercourse with the
defendant.
She also testified that she knew the codefendant "pretty
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(a) (West 1970 & Supp. 1985) provides:
Any person who shall willfully and lewdly commit any lewd or
lascivious act including any of the acts constituting other
crimes provided for in Part 1 of this code upon or with the
body, or any part or member thereof, of a child under the age
of 14 years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of such person or of
such child, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned
in the state prison for a term of three, six, or eight years.

Id.
10. This subsection provides that probation will not be granted to U[al person convicted of a violation of Section 288 and who was a stranger to the child victim or made
friends with the victim for the purpose of committing an act of violation of Section 288,
unless the defendant honestly believed the victim was 14 years old or older." CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1203.066(a)(3) (West Supp. 1985).
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well" for about a year, had seen him a few days before the incident and that she considered the codefendant her boyfriend.
She stated that she was good friends with the defendant and
had had sexual relations short of intercourse with both men. Finally, she testified that she had told both defendants that she
was over the age of sixteen.
The trial court found both men guilty of violating Penal
Code section 288(a).1l The defendant was sentenced to three
years in state prison. He appealed, contending that a good faith
reasonable mistake of age constitutes a defense to a section 288
charge.
The text of section 288 does not indicate whether the reasonable mistake defense is applicable to a charge of lewd and
lascivious conduct with a minor under the age of fourteen. The
court therefore turned to other cases that discussed this defense.
In People v. Vogel/ 2 the California Supreme Court held that a
good faith belief that a previous marriage had been terminated
was a valid defense to a charge of bigamy. The Vogel court
noted the legislative declarations in Penal Code section 20,13
which requires that there be a union of act and intent in every
crime and in Penal Code section 26,14 which provides that ignorance of or mistake of fact disproves criminal intent. Relying on
these two sections and Vogel, the court in People v. Hernandez US allowed a reasonable mistake defense in a statutory
rape case. The victim in that case was seventeen years, nine
months old and had consented to sexual intercourse. The court
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(a) (West 1970 and Supp. 1985). For relevant statutory
language, see supra note 9.
12. 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956).
13. CAL. PENAL CODE § 20 (West 1970) provides that "[tlo constitute crime there
must be unity of act and intent. In every crime or public offense there must exist a
union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence."
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (West 1970 & Supp. 1985) provides:
All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes: ... Persons who committed
the act or made the omission charged under an ignorance or
mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent . . . .
Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged
through misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there
was no evil design, intention, or culpable negligence.
Id.
15. 61 Cal. 2d 529, 393 P.2d 673, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1964).
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held the essential element of criminal intent is missing when the
person engaging in sexual intercourse with a minor reasonably
believes the minor to be over eighteen years of age.
The Hernandez court, however, stated that its holding was
not intended to extend to cases involving acts with an "infant"
female, and that it was not withdrawing from the sound public
policy of protecting the sexually naive female. 16 Three post-Hernandez court of appeal decisions refused to apply the Hernandez rule in cases involving the offense of lewd and lascivious
conduct with a child under the age of fourteen. The court in
People v. Tober l7 rejected the defense in a case involving a ten
year old victim. The court noted that a refusal to distinguish
between a child and an adult may be characteristic of those who
engage in the kind of conduct which falls under section 288, and
relied upon the Hernandez court's statement that a good faith
mistake as to age is untenable when the victim is of "tender
years."
The court in People v. Toliver l6 distinguished between a violation of section 288, which does not involve consent of any
sort, and statutory rape, in which a male who believes in good
faith that a female is over eighteen therefore believes that she
can consent to sexual intercourse. It noted that the purpose of
section 288 was to protect infants and children, and that there
was no reason why the age of fourteen should not continue to be
the dividing line between a child and a mature person. IS
The third case, People v. Gutierrez,20 relied on Tober and
Toliver and the public policy considerations upon which those
decisions were based, declaring them to be based upon a rationale that is still sound. 21
The California Supreme Court in Olsen found the reasoning
of the three court of appeal cases and the dictum in Hernandez
to be persuasive. The court agreed that section 288 was enacted
16. [d. at 536, 393 P.2d at 677, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 365.

17. 241 Cal. App. 2d 66, 50 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966).
18. 270 Cal. App. 2d 492, 75 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1969).
19. [d. at 496, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
20. 80 Cal. App. 3d 829, 145 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1978).
21. [d. at 834-35, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
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for the purpose of protecting children of tender years. That public policy, the court determined, compels a conclusion that a reasonable mistake of age is not a defense under section 288.
The court found further support for its holding in various
legislative prOVISIOns. Under. Penal Code section
1203.066(a)(3)(A), certain individuals convicted under 288 may
be eligible for probation if they "honestly and reasonably believed the victim was 14 years or older." This, plus the fact that
no mistake of age was included in section 288, strongly indicates
that the legislature did not intend to permit such a defense. If
such a defense were recognized, the question of probation would
never arise, rendering section 1203.066(a)(3)(A) a nullity. The
courts are extremely reluctant to construe statutes in such a way
as to render existing provisions unnecessary.22
The court also found it significant that children under the
age of fourteen are given special protection under other state
laws, and cited Penal Code section 271 23 which provides for punishment for desertion of a child under fourteen, and section
271(a),U which makes it a crime to abandon or fail to maintain a
child under fourteen. The severity of punishment for crimes involving children under fourteen when compared to crimes with
persons between fourteen and eighteen was also found to be an
indication of the state's special policy of protection for those
under fourteen. For example, the maximum punishment for a
violation of section 288 is eight years in prison while the maximum penalty for unlawful sexual intercourse is one year in
county jailor three years in state prison.
Justice Grodin, in a concurring and dissenting opmIOn,
agreed that the enactment of section 1203.0662& is persuasive evidence that the legislature did not intend a good faith mistake of
age to be a defense to a section 288 offense. Justice Grodin contended, however, that imprisoning a person who acted with a
reasonable belief and is guilty of no other offense "smacks of
cruel and unusual punishment." He noted that normally a per22. City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d 47, 52, 648 P.2d 935, 938,
184 Cal. Rptr. 713, 716 (1982).
23. CAL. PENAL CODE § 271 (West 1970 & Supp. 1985).
24. CAL. PENAL CODE § 271(a) (West 1970 & Supp. 1985).
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.066(a)(3) (West Supp. 1985).
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son cannot be convicted of a traditional crime absent a showing
of fault and that strict liability crimes are almost always restricted to violations of regulatory laws which carry with them
no grave harm to the individual's reputation.
Finally, Justice Grodin stated that the legislature, in section
1203.066, has set a standard for reasonable mistake of age for a
section 288 violation. When that standard is reached, it could be
stated that "the defendant is acting in a way which is no different from the way our society would expect a reasonable, careful,
and law-abiding citizen to act." According to Justice Grodin, imposing criminal sanctions under these circumstances is
intolerable.
The California Supreme Court broke with the majority of
jurisdictions by holding in Hernandez that statutory rape involving victims between the ages of fourteen and eighteen was
not a strict liability crime. The Hernandez court, however, explicitly refused to extend that policy to sexual acts with children. 28 The court has made it clear that, under section 288, an
individual acts at his own peril. A key factor in these cases is the
capacity of the woman to consent to engage in sexual activity.
There is a conclusive presumption that a victim under the age of
fourteen lacks this capacity. Protection is provided for all children under the age of fourteen regardless of the offender's reasonable beliefs. As for the offender, it is sufficient that in cases
of genuine and reasonable mistake the legislature has provided
for probation under section 1203.66.
3. Evidence that a victim is suffering from rape
trauma syndrome is not admissible to prove that a
rape has occurred.
People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal.
Rptr. 450 (1984). In People v. Bledsoe, the California Supreme
Court held that although expert testimony on the effects of rape
may be admitted for a variety of purposes, testimony that a rape
victim is suffering from "rape trauma syndrome" is not admissible to prove that a rape has in fact occurred. The court concluded, however, that the admission of the testimony in this case
26. People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 536, 393 P.2d 673, 677, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361,
365 (1964).
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was not prejudicial. Accordingly, the court upheld the conviction.
Melanie, age fourteen, asked the defendant for a ride home
from a party. On the way to her home, the defendant told her
that he needed to stop at his home and pick up some money.
While inside, the defendant attacked Melanie and threatened to
cut her throat if she did not have sexual intercourse with him.
Melan~e, believing that the defendant was holding a knife, did
what the defendant ordered. After engaging in intercourse, the
defendant returned Melanie to the party, where she told her
friends what had occurred. The defendant was arrested and
charged with (1) forcible rape; (2) use of a deadly weapon during
the commission of a rape; (3) assault with a deadly weapon; and
(4) false imprisonment.
At trial, the prosecution called a rape counselor who had
treated Melanie after the incident. The counselor testified, over
the objections of defense counsel, that Melanie was suffering
from rape trauma syndrome. The counselor further testified that
rape trauma syndrome is an umbrella term which describes the
behavior of rape victims in 99.9 % of all rape cases. In response
to a question from the prosecution, the counselor concluded that
based on her experience and her work with Melanie, it was obvious that Melanie was suffering from rape trauma syndrome.
The jury found the defendant guilty of forcible rape but determined that he had not used a weapon during the commission
of the rape and therefore found him not guilty of assault with a
deadly weapon. The jury could not reach a verdict on the false
imprisonment charge. The charge was dropped at the request of
the prosecution.
Defendant appealed, contending that the court erred in admitting the counselor's testimony on rape trauma syndrome.
The defendant maintained that (1) the trial court's action was
inconsistent with People v. Guthreau 27 and People v. Clark,28
where the admission of certain expert testimony of a rape counselor was held to,be in error; and (2) in any event, the testimony
27. 102 Cal. App. 3d 436, 162 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1980).
28. 109 Cal. App. 3d 88, 167 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1980).
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should not have been admitted because rape trauma syndrome
does not meet the Frye 29 standard of reliability to determine the
admissibility of new scientific methods of proof.30
The California Supreme Court distinguished Guthreau and
Clark from the instant case. In those cases, police counselors testified that the victims' resistance was reasonable. The Guthreau
and Clark courts held that the issue in rape prosecution is not
rape in the abstract but whether the resistance was sufficient to
reasonably manifest the victim's refusal to consent to the sexual
act. The courts in Guthreau and Clark therefore held that expert opinion that the victim's resistance was reasonable was irrelevant. In Bledsoe the rape counselor did not testify concerning the reasonableness of Melanie's resistance but rather about
the emotional behavior exhibited by Melanie after the rape
which indicated that she was suffering from rape trauma syndrome. Therefore the California Supreme Court held Guthreau
and Clark to be inapposite.
The question of whether evidence of rape trauma syndrome
is admissible under the Frye standard presented a more difficult
issue. The test set out by the court in Frye is that in order to
admit expert testimony which is deduced from a scientific principle or theory, the principle or theory must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in that particular
field of science. 31 In the few cases in which rape trauma syndrome has arisen as an issue, the defendant raised as a defense
an aspect of the victim's conduct which shed doubt on the victim's allegations of having been raped. 32 Accordingly, evidence
on rape trauma syndrome was allowed to rebut these defenses.
The supreme court found that allowing such testimony in these
cases serves to inform the jury of findings of professional research on the subject of a victim's reaction to sexual assault.
The court distinguished Bledsoe from those cases where the
29. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
30. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976).
31. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
32. See, e.g., Delia S. v. Torres, 134 Cal. App. 3d 471, 478·79, 184 Cal. Rptr. 787, 792
(1982) (delay in reporting assault); State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 435-37, 657 P.2d
1215, 1219·20 (1983) (inconsistent post· incident statements by fourteen year old incest
victim).
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evidence was admitted to rebut an inference of the defendant
concerning the victim's conduct. In Bledsoe, there was no inconsistent evidence regarding the conduct of Melanie. The victim
promptly reported the attack, displayed a severe emotional reaction and suffered bruises, all of which supported the fact that
she had been raped. The court therefore held that there was no
need to introduce the evidence of rape trauma syndrome. The
court determined that the prosecutor was introducing the evidence to prove that a rape had, in fact, occurred and that this
was Improper.
Cases upholding the admissibility of expert testimony concerning the "battered child syndrome" provided an apt analogy.
However, the court made an important distinction between rape
trauma syndrome and battered child syndrome. The criteria for
battered child syndrome was established to further the efforts of
authorities to identify and protect children who were abused.
Rape trauma syndrome, on the other hand, was designed primarily to serve as a counseling device to aid psychologists in
treating the emotional problems of rape victims. The court determined that since rape trauma syndrome was developed for an
entirely different purpose than the battered child syndrome,
rape trauma syndrome cannot be used in the same manner in
court. It therefore held that expert testimony that a woman suffers from rape trauma syndrome is not admissible to prove that
the woman was raped.
The court determined, however, that the error in admitting
the counselor's testimony in this case was not prejudicial. Melanie told her friends that she had been attacked immediately
after being returned to the party. She had several bruises which
were not explained by the defense. The court held the remaining
evidence to be sufficient corroboration of her testimony that she
had been raped. The court concluded that although evidence of
the rape counselor should not have been admitted, it did no
more than provide the jury with information already at their
disposal.
In Bledsoe, the supreme court acted cautiously in not allowing evidence of rape trauma syndrome to come into evidence
to prove the fact of rape. In doing so, the court sought to protect
defendants from testimony which may appear reliable solely be-
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cause it is offered by a rape counselor. This approach may be
appropriate where, as in this case, the defendant did not put the
victim's post-rape conduct at issue and therefore testimony regarding the syndrome may be both extraneous and damaging to
the defendant. However, where the victim's post-rape conduct is
at issue, expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome is both material and relevant and should be admitted.
B.

Felony Child Abuse
1. Felony child abuse may not serve as the underly-

ing felony to support a conviction of second degree
murder under the felony murder theory.
People v. Smith, 35 Cal. 3d 798, 678 P.2d 886, 201 Cal.
Rptr. 311 (1984). In People v. Smith, the California Supreme
Court held that felony child abuse cannot serve as the underlying felony to support a conviction of second degree felony murder. The court reasoned that since the acts constituting felony
child abuse in this case were an integral part of the homicide,
the offense merged into the homicide.
Defendant and her two daughters, Beth and Amy, lived
with a man named Foster. Defendant became angry at Amy and
began beating her, knocking her to the floor. Foster joined defendant to "assist" her in disciplining Amy. Beth testified that
both Foster and defendant repeatedly struck Amy with both
their hands and a paddle and also bit her. Eventually, defendant
knocked the child backwards. Amy fell, hit her head on the
closet door and suffered a severe head injury. Defendant and
Foster took Amy to the hospital where she died later the same
evening.
The trial court gave a second degree felony murder instruction. 88 The instruction informed the jury that an unlawful killing, whether intentional, unintentional, or accidental is second
degree murder if it occurs during the commission of a felony inherently dangerous to human life, and that felony child abuse is
such a crime. Defendant contended that on the facts of this case,
the crime of felony child abuse was an integral part and included in fact within the homicide, and therefore it merged into
33. CALJIC No. 8.32 (4th ed. 1979).
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the homicide under the reasoning of People v. Ireland. 34
In Ireland, the California Supreme Court held the felony
murder doctrine inapplicable to felonies which are an integral
part of and are included in fact within the homicide. 311 The jury
in Ireland was instructed that it could find the defendant guilty
of second degree felony murder if it determined that the homicide occurred in the commission of the underlying felony of assault with a deadly weapon. 36 The supreme court disagreed,
holding that the application of the felony murder doctrine
should not be extended beyond its rational function since to do
so would effectively preclude the jury from considering the issue
of intent where a homicide has been committed as a result of a
felonious assault, a category which includes the majority of all
homicides.
In People v. Burton,37 the California Supreme Court refined
the Ireland rule by adding the caveat that the felony murder
doctrine may nevertheless apply if the underlying offense was
committed with an independent felonious purpose. Even if the
felony was included in the facts of the homicide and was integral
thereto, a further inquiry is required to determine whether the
homicide was the result of an independent felonious purpose or
a single course of conduct with a single purpose. Therefore, in
cases like Ireland, where the purpose of the conduct was the
very assault which caused the death, the felony murder rule is
inapplicable. In a homicide in the course of an armed robbery,
for example, there is the independent purpose to acquire money
or property belonging to another. In such an instance, the felony
murder rule would apply.
Felony child abuse as defined by section 273(a)38 can occur
in a variety of circumstances. The definition is broad and includes both active and passive conduct: child abuse by direct assault and endangering the child by extreme neglect. The princi34. 70 Cal. 2d 522, 450 P.2d 580, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1969) (the defendant and his
wife were experiencing serious marital problems which culminated in defendant shooting
and killing his wife).
35. [d. at 539, 450 P.2d at 590, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
36. [d.
37. 6 Cal. 3d 375, 387, 491 P.2d 793, 801, 99 Cal. Rptr. I, 9 (1971).
38. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a)(1) (West 1970 & Supp. 1985).
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pIes of Ireland and Burton would bar the use of the felony
murder doctrine where the purpose of the child abuse is the very
assault which results in the death of the child. 39 In the instant
case, the California Supreme Court found that the homicide was
the result of child abuse by direct assault. Therefore, the underlying felony was unquestionably an "integral part of and included in fact" of the homicide within the meaning of Ireland.
The Smith court furthermore could conceive of no independent
purpose for the conduct. The ostensible purpose of the felony
murder rule is to deter negligent or accidental killing that may
occur in the course of committing that felony. When someone
willfully assaults a child, the court could not see how the felony
murder rule would work to deter a person from killing accidentally or negligently in the course of that felony. The court, despite its expressed abhorrence of child abuse, refused to deviate
from the Ireland rule simply because the victim was a child
rather than an adult. Further, the court concluded that the felony murder rule does not serve any deterrent function.
39. There are several cases in which the second degree felony murder doctrine has
withstood an Ireland attack. People v. Taylor, 11 Cal. App. 3d 57, 89 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1970) (underlying felony was furnishing narcotics); People v. Calzada, 13 Cal. App. 3d
603, 91 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1970) (underlying felony was driving under the influence of narcotics); People v. Mattison, 4 Cal. 3d 177,481 P.2d 193, 93 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1971) (underlying felony was administering poison); People v. Shockley, 79 Cal. App. 3d 669, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 200 (1978) (underlying felony was child abuse by willful cruelty and endangering);
People v. Northrop, 132 Cal. App. 3d 1027, 182 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1982) (underlying felony
was child abuse by physical beating). Except for Northrop, however, none of these decisions involved an underlying felony that had as its principal purpose an assault on the
person of the victim.
In Northrop, there was evidence that their child's death was caused by organ and
bone injuries resulting from the infliction of blunt force. The Northrop court declared
that there was no bar to application of the felony murder rule because felony child abuse
may be committed without either an intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm, and
thus has a felonious design independent of the resulting homicide. Northrop, 132 Cal.
App. 3d at 1036, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 202. The supreme court in Smith, however, held that
the Northrop court's conclusion that there was an independent purpose does not follow
from its premise concerning possible lack of intent. The Northrop court relied on People
v. Mattison, 4 Cal. 3d 177, 481 P.2d 193, 93 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1971), where the supreme
court held that the felony of poisoning did not merge into the reSUlting homicide. The
Mattison court held that because the underlying felony was not done with the intent to
commit injury which would cause death, it had an independent design. Id. at 85, 481
P.2d at 198-99, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 190-91. The independent design in Mattison, however,
was to furnish a dangerous substance for financial gain. The Smith court stated that, by
definition, felony child abuse occurs only under circumstances or conditions likely to
produce great bodily harm or death. Therefore, the Smith court concluded that it is
untenable to assert that there is an independent design when the crime of felony child
abuse of the assaultive variety is willfully committed. To the extent that Northrop is
inconsistent with the court's reasoning in Smith, it was disapproved.
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In Smith, the California Supreme Court refused to allow active and willful felony child abuse to serve as the underlying felony to a second degree felony murder instruction. The decision
stems from the court's unwillingness to extend the felony murder rule which allows a murder conviction without considering
the intent or malice of the defendant. Despite the court's dislike
of the felony murder rule, it has long recognized the need to retain the doctrine for use in certain situations where strong countervailing policies so dictate. In this case, where the countervailing policy of protecting children from assaultive child abuse
is so compelling, the court should have reexamined the possible
deterrent effects of the rule instead of concluding that there will
be no deterrence simply because assaultive child abuse involves
a willful act.
C.

Child Stealing
1. Parent not guilty of child stealing where reconciliation cancels an interlocutory custody decree.

People u. HQward, 36 Cal. 3d 852, 686 P.2d 644, 206 Cal.
Rptr. 124 (1984). In People u. Howard, the California Supreme
Court held that a parent was not guilty of child stealing40 where
a reconciliation effectively canceled an interlocutory custody decree. The cancellation of the interlocutory decree meant that the
state had failed to establish the existence of a child custody order, one of the essential elements of the crime of child stealing.
The court therefore ruled that the trial court's failure to instruct
the jury concerning reconciliation constituted reversible error.
In Howard, the parties obtained an interlocutory judgment
of dissolution in July 1978 whereby the wife received custody of
the couple's two children. Defendant was awarded visitation
rights. After one month, defendant moved back into the family
home and the couple resumed marital relations. After two years,
defendant went to Colorado to care for his father. The wife concluded that this signaled the couple's final breakup and signed a
request for a final judgment of dissolution. Defendant believed
that his wife was not properly caring for the children and re40. CAL. PENAL CODE § 278.5 (West Supp. 1985), added by 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1399, §
11, amended by 1983 Cal. Stat. ch. 990, § 4, further amended by 1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 1207,
§ 3. Defendant was convicted of violating the 1976 version of section 278.5. Therefore,
subsequent references to this section will be to the 1976 version.
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turned to California in August 1980. He took the children after
promising the babysitter that he would return in two hours. He
in fact moved the children to Colorado. He refused to allow the
children to telephone their mother.
Defendant was charged with and convicted of child stealing.41 He appealed on two grounds. First, he contended that the
trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on reconciliation.
Second, he argued that the trial court erred in failing to instruct
the jury concerning good faith mistake. The California Supreme
Court determined that defendant's first contention was meritorious and therefore did not address the second ground for appeal.
In order to obtain a conviction. under Penal Code section
278.5, the prosecution must establish the existence of a valid
child custody order. 42 The California Supreme Court found no
cases which addressed the question of whether a reconciliation
by a husband and wife cancels a child custody order granted as
part of an interlocutory decree of dissolution. The court did,
however, find that cases in the area of spousal support provided
significant guidance. These cases have held that reconciliation
and resumption of marital relations cancel an interlocutory
order.43
In In re Marriage of Modnick,44 the California Supreme
Court held that when a husband and wife reconcile following an
interlocutory decree, the right to a final decree is extinguished
and the couple is entitled to the restoration of all marital rights
and obligations. The Modnick court also held that in determining whether a reconciliation has occurred, the court need only
examine the intent of the parties to permanently reunite as hus41. CAL. PENAL CODE § 278.5 (West Supp. 1985).
42. Section 278.5(a) provides that "[e)very person who in violation of the physical
custody provisions of a custody order, judgment, or decree takes, detains, conceals, or
retains the child with the intent to deprive another person of his or her rights to physical
custody or visitation shall be punished . . . . " CAL. PENAL CODE § 278.5(a) (West. Supp.
1985).
43. See, e.g., Harrold v. Harrold, 100 Cal. App. 2d 601, 609, 224 P.2d 66, 70-71
(1950); Tompkins v. Tompkins, 202 Cal. App. 2d 55, 59-63, 20 Cal. Rptr. 530, 532-35
(1962); Purdy v. Purdy, 138 Cal. App. 2d 402, 405, 291 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1956); Morgan v.
Morgan, 106 Cal. App. 2d 189, 192, 234 P.2d 782, 784 (1951); Peters v. Peters, 16 Cal.
App. 2d 383, 386-87, 60 P.2d 313, 315 (1936).
44. 33 Cal. 3d 897, 911, 663 P.2d 187, 195, 191 Cal. Rptr. 629, 637 (1983).
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band and wife. 46 This intent must be clearly proved by the party
asserting that a reconciliation has occurred. 46
In Howard, the California Supreme Court determined that
there was a reconciliation as a matter of law. After obtaining the
interlocutory order, the couple lived together for two years and
held themselves out as husband and wife. They engaged in marital acts such as signing a joint rental agreement, maintaining a
joint checking account and sharing the responsibility for raising
their children. During the trial, the wife testified that she had
earlier failed to tell the truth when, at the time she signed the
request for a final judgment of dissolution, she stated that she
and her husband were not reconciled. Finally, neither the husband nor the wife took steps to enforce the interlocutory decree.
Applying the Modnick test, the court determined that the
couple had an unequivocal and unconditional intention to reunite as husband and wife. Since the couple had reunited before a
final decree was entered, the court concluded that the interlocutory decree was canceled. Absent the required child custody order, the court reversed the conviction.
Chief Justice Bird, who wrote for the majority, also wrote a
concurring opinion in which she addressed the defendant's second defense. The Chief Justice asserted that an honest, good
faith albeit mistaken belief that there has been a reconciliation
constitutes a defense to violation of Penal Code section 278.5.
Relying on the legislative history of that section and the rules of
statutory construction, she determined that the statute contained a specific intent element. For a "noncustodial parent" to
be convicted under this section, it must be proved that he or she
had the specific intent to deprive the legal custodian of his or
her right of custody pursuant to a custody order, judgment or
decree. Therefore, the Chief Justice reasoned, even if the child
custody agreement in Howard was still in effect, the husband's
good faith belief that the order was invalid would constitute a
valid defense, requiring reversal of the trial court verdict.
Justice Mosk, dissenting, disagreed with the majority's in45. [d. at 912 n.14, 663 P.2d at 196 n.14, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 638 n.14.
46. [d. at 911, 663 P.2d at 196, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
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terpretation of both the facts and the applicable law. He disputed the majority's determination that there had been a reconciliation as a matter of law. He would have held that at most
there was an attempted reconciliation which fell short of being
successful. He persuasively argued that the husband's behavior
in lying to the babysitter, moving the children to Colorado and
not allowing the children to telephone their mother was inconsistent with a good faith belief in the invalidity of the child custody order. Justice Mosk argued that the husband violated the
spirit of the statute by resorting to the type of self-help measure
the statute was intended to prevent. However, this argument
only addresses Chief Justice Bird's concurring opinion, since the
majority based its holding on its determination that the interlocutory decree was invalid. Therefore, while Justice Mosk's argument was persuasive, it was not relevant to the majority's holding in the case.

II.

FAMILY LAW

A.

Community Property
1.

Wife entitled to that portion of the husband's disability which represents her share of community
property interest in his retirement benefits.

In re Marriage of Justice, 157 Cal. App. 3d 82, 204 Cal.
Rptr. 6 (2nd Dist. 1984). In In re Marriage of Justice, the court
of appeal affirmed a trial court order that the wife be paid that
portion of the husband's disability pension which represented
her share of the community property interest in his retirement
benefits. The court followed the rule established by the California Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Stenquist"7 that only
the excess of a disability pension over the amount of regular retirement benefits was separate property; the remaining amount
in effect replaced ordinary retirement pay and was a community
asset.
The husband was a police officer who retired on a disability
pension two months before his twenty-year retirement date. The
disability was based on an injury received eight years earlier.
Under a prior dissolution agreement, the wife was to receive
payments of her share of the husband's retirement benefits upon
47. 21 Cal. 3d 779, 582 P.2d 96, 148 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978).
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the arrival of his twenty-year retirement date, regardless of
whether he retired. Upon reaching the retirement date, however,
the husband refused to pay, contending that he was receiving
disability rather than a retirement pension.
The wife obtained an order from the trial court directing
the husband to pay her her share of the retirement funds. The
husband appealed, relying on the holding in In re Marriage of
Jones. 48 In Jones, the California Supreme Court held that disability benefits are separate property when the right to a service
pension has not vested at the time that a disability retirement is
taken.'s The court in Justice, citing Stenquist, pointed out that
the holding in Jones was overturned a year later in In re Marriage of Brown. IlO Brown held that both vested and non vested
pension rights arising from employment during marriage were
community property assets. III
Stenquist involved a serviceman who elected to take a disability pension rather than a service pension, and then claimed
that the entire disability pension was his separate property
under the reasoning of Jones. The California Supreme Court rejected that claim on two grounds. First, the court stated that
permitting the election of a disability pension which operated to
defeat a community property interest in a longevity pension
would violate the principle that one spouse cannot invoke a condition wholly within his or her control which results in the loss
of community interest of the other spouse. 1I2 Second, the court
held that only that portion of a disability pension in excess of an
ordinary retirement pension is property allocated to the disability itself, where the primary purpose of the disability payments
is to compensate for the loss of earnings due to premature
retirement. 113
Since the husband in Justice had not accumulated the number of years required to enable him to choose between a disabil48. 13 Cal. 3d 457, 531 P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975).
49. A vested pension is one not forfeited by termination of employment. In re Mar·
riage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 842, 544 P.2d 561, 563, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 635 (1976).
50. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
51. Id. at 851-52, 544 P.2d at 569-70, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 641-42.
52. Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d at 786-87, 582 P.2d at 101, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 14.
53.Id.
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ity or a service pension, the court determined that the second
factor in Stenquist was applicable and looked to the primary
purpose of the benefits rather than the label placed on the benefits. In this case, the police department based both service pensions and disability pensions on a "normal pension base." No
police officer could receive both a disability and service pension.
Therefore in Justice disability benefits were largely intended to
replace retirement benefits.
California courts, recognizing that pension benefits are becoming an increasingly significant part of employee compensation, are following a course markedly different than that suggested by Jones just ten years ago. Jones had held that a
community property interest in a nonvested retirement pension
was' an expectancy, not a property interest. The change of law
over the past decade demonstrates that courts now recognize
that characterizing a disability pension as separate property
under the circumstances present in Justice impairs a community
interest of the spouse which is deserving of judicial protection.
As the time for retirement draws near, the pension may be the
most important asset of the marriage. Disability retirements,
even though taken before service retirement benefits have
vested, represent in large part service retirement payments. The
courts now recognize that to deprive one spouse of a share in
that property would result in an inequitable division of the marital community property.

2. Separate property of a spouse which is converted
to joint tenancy during the marriage or is used to
acquire joint tenancy property during marriage is
presumed to be community property.
In re Marriage of Neal, 153 Cal. App. 3d 117, 200 Cal. Rptr.
341 (1st Dist. 1984); In re Marriage of Anderson, 154 Cal. App.
3d 572, 201 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1st Dist. 1984). Several courts of appeal decisions have interpreted recently enacted Civil Code sections 4800.1114 and 4800.2.~5 In In re Marriage of Neal, the court
held that a residence owned as separate property by a putative
spouse prior to marriage is presumed to be community property
when, during marriage, she placed title to the property in joint
54.
55.

CAL. CIV. CODE
CAL. CIV. CODE

§ 4800.1 (West Supp. 1985).
§ 4800.2 (West Supp. 1985).
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tenancy with her husband. In In re Marriage of Anderson, the
court likewise held that the section 4800.1 presumption arises
upon the conveyance of title to both spouses as joint tenants
during marriage notwithstanding that the property may have
been owned by one spouse before marriage. The Anderson court
further held that the husband was entitled to reimbursement for
his separate property contribution under Civil Code section
4800.2.
In Neal, a house owned by the wife prior to marriage was
transferred to joint tenancy with her husband. This change in
title was required by a lender as a prerequisite to a refinancing
arrangement. The wife claimed that she and her husband orally
agreed that the house would remain her separate property. The
trial court determined the house to be separate property pursuant to the oral agreement. The husband appealed.
In Anderson, a house owned by the husband prior to marriage was transferred to joint tenancy with his wife. This change
was required by a lender as a prerequisite to a home equity loan.
At trial, the husband testified that he had no idea that he was
giving his wife a one-half interest in the house. The trial court
determined that the house was community property based on
the husband's conveyance during the home equity loan transaction and ordered the husband to pay the wife a one-half share of
the value of the house. The husband appealed.
In In re Marriage of Lucas/'S the California Supreme Court
distinguished the "common law" presumption arising out of the
form of title from the general presumption set forth in Civil
Code section 5110117 that property acquired during marriage is
community property. The statutory presumption could be rebutted by tracing the source of funds that were used to acquire the
property to separate property. The common law presumption
could not be rebutted in this fashion; it required an understanding or agreement, either written or oral, between the parties to
rebut the presumption. 1I8 The Lucas court also held that absent
an agreement to the contrary, the parties' contribution from separate funds toward the acquisition of community property was
56. 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980).
57. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West 1983).
58. Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d at 814-15, 614 P.2d at 288, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
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considered a gift to the community.1i9
The legislature responded to the Lucas decision by enacting
California Civil code sections 4800.1 and 4800.2.60 Section 4800.1
superseded the "common law" presumption of title concerning
property acquired during marriage in joint tenancy. It also expanded section 5110, which had created a presumption that a
single family residence acquired by a couple in joint tenancy
during marriage was presumed to be community property. Section 4800.1 created the pres~mption that all property acquired
in joint tenancy during marriage is community property. Unlike
the rule set out in Lucas, section 4800.1 requires a writing to
rebut the presumption.
Section 4800.2, unlike section 4800.1, applies to all community property, not just property held in joint tenancy. Absent a
written waiver, section 4800.2 requires that a party be reimbursed for contributions to the acquisition of property to the extent the party can trace the contributions to a separate property
source. This section overrules Lucas, insofar as it failed to recognize the parties' separate contribution to the acquisition of community property absent an oral or written agreement. 61
The California Legislature stated that the new provisions
would apply to proceedings commenced before the date of enactment on January 1, 1984 to the extent that the division of property was not yet fina1. 62 Neal and Anderson both applied the
statute retroactively without addressing whether retroactive application was proper. 6S
59. Id. at 816, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
60. Stats. 1983, ch. 342 § 4, 1983 Cal. Adv. Legis. Servo 36 (West) (codified at CAL.
CIV. CODE § 4800.1 (West Supp. 1985)); stats. 1983, ch. 342 § 2, 1983 Cal. Adv. Legis.
Servo 36 (West) (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.2 (West Supp. 1985)).
61. Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d at 816, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 585.
62. Stats. 1983, ch. 342 § 4, 1983 Cal. Adv. Legis. Servo 36 (West) (codified at CAL.
CIV. CODE § 4800.1 (West Supp. 1985)).
63. The two courts that did address the issue of retroactivity reached opposite results. In In re Marriage of Martinez, 156 Cal. App. 3d 20, 28-29, 202 Cal. Rptr. 646, 652
(1984), the court held that although the normal rule was not to apply a statute retroactively, where the intent of the legislature was clear, retroactive application was warranted. It further held that section 4800.1 did not violate due process because retroactive
application of the statute did not interfere with vested rights; it merely shifted the evidentiary burden of proof where a joint tenancy deed was involved. Id. at 30, 202 Cal.
Rptr. at 653.
Cf. In re Marriage of Milse, 159 Cal. App. 3d 471 (1984), hg. granted, November 21,

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss3/4

24

Black and Hardy: California Law Survey

1985]

CALIFORNIA LAW SURVEY

599

In Neal, the court reasoned that absent legislative intent to
the contrary, the language of section 4800.1 could be construed
not to apply to separate property which is placed (rather than
acquired) in joint tenancy with the other spouse during marriage. Direct evidence of legislative intent, however, appears in
the reports of the senate committee which considered Assembly
Bill 26. 64 The report states that section 4800.1 governs property
acquired before the marriage when the title is taken in joint tenancy during the marriage. The Neal court held, therefore, that
the change in title from separate property to joint tenancy during the marriage established a presumption which could be rebutted only by a writing expressing a contrary intent. No such
writing was present in Neal.
In Anderson, the court similarly reasoned that the legislative purpose of section 4800.1 was to expand the family law
court's jurisdiction over assets that spouses frequently hold in
joint tenancy, thereby allowing a sensible disposition of all marital property.
The court further held that the new statute's purpose was
to avoid the inequities of Lucas,6r, where the presumption of a
gift to the community often required the equal division of property taken in joint tenancy, despite a showing that one spouse
contributed a substantial portion from his or her separate property. The court therefore concluded that the husband was entitled to reimbursement for his separate property contribution
under Civil Code section 4800.2 and remanded the case to the
trial court with instructions to determine the value of the award.
The award should be based on the value of the property at the
time of its conversion to joint tenancy.
The Neal court was highly critical of the legislature's enactment of section 4800.1. The harsh result of this case was characterized by the court as a "trap for the unwary" where different
1984 (L.A. 32004), where the court held that retroactive application of section 4800.1
would be an unconstitutional deprivation of a vested property right without due process
of law. The court reasoned that the wife made an oral agreement preserving her separate
property interest in reliance on Lucas. As a result, the wife's interest in the property
became vested at the time of the agreement.
64. 83 Sen. J. 4865-66 (1983).
65. Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d at 816, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
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allocations of property are made based solely on the form of title
by which the property was taken. However, the court merely abdicated its role in remedying the injustice by concluding that
since the inequity was created by statute, the cure should also
come from the legislature. The Neal court could have reached a
more just and equitable result by addressing the due process issue and refusing to apply the statute retroactively. The Anderson court, on the other hand, applied section 4800.1 expansively
without criticizing the legislature's judgment in enacting the
statute. Both courts mitigated the harshness of section 4800.1,
however, by reimbursing the spouse for the value of the property
at the time of the transfer to joint tenancy rather than the lower
value at the time of marriage.
3.

A debt owed to a spouse as part of a property settlement agreement can be discharged in bankruptcy if it arises out of a division of community
property unrelated to alimony, support or
maintenance.

In re Marriage of Williams, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1215, 203 Cal.
Rptr. 909 (5th Dist. 1984). In In re Marriage of Williams, the
court of appeal held that a former wife's debt to her ex-husband
as part of a property settlement was dischargeable in bankruptcy since it was unrelated to alimony, support or maintenance. Therefore, the court reasoned, the trial court's decision to
allow the husband an offset against monies he owed his ex-wife
frustrated the purpose of the federal bankruptcy laws and the
United States Constitution.

During the dissolution hearing, the trial court, in order to
equalize the division of community property and community
debts, ordered the wife to execute and deliver to the husband a
promissory note in the amount of $3,048.99 as well as certain
other personal property. The court determined that thirty-six
percent of her husband's retirement income was community
property, of which the wife's share was $81.49 per month. Also
under the dissolution decree, the husband was ordered to pay
$9,426.37 and the wife $3,864.59 of community debts.
The wife subsequently filed a petition in bankruptcy in
which the husband was named as a creditor. This operated to
discharge all of her debts, including the debt owed to her hus-
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band. The husband did not appear in the bankruptcy proceeding to object to wife's discharge of these debts or to try to offset
the amount of wife's indebtedness. Soon afterwards, the creditors of the community filed law suits to satisfy their debts
against the husband alone.
The husband made no monthly payments out of his retirement income to his wife on the ground that the wife had failed
to comply with her obligation to deliver the note and the property. Wife obtained a writ of execution and levied on husband's
savings account for the arrearages of $3,895.00 in the monthly
payments due her. The husband filed a notice of motion to
quash the writ and to vacate the levy.
The trial court granted the husband the right to offset the
wife's indebtedness to him as well as any amounts he was required to pay creditors which the wife had been ordered to pay
under the dissolution order. The trial court therefore quashed
the writ and vacated the levy.
Although California Civil Code section 438066 and California
Code of Civil Procedure section 12867 give any court the inherent
power to make all necessary orders to enforce or give effect to
their judgments, this power is limited by the power given to the
federal courts in adjudicating bankruptcy. It is established in
both California68 and federallaw69 that while alimony judgments
or judgments in the nature of alimony, maintenance, and support are not affected by a discharge in bankruptcy, settlements
of property rights are so affected. In this case, the court of appeal specifically stated that the $3,048.99 debt owed the husband, which the wife subsequently discharged in the bankruptcy
proceeding, was necessary for the equalization of the community
property and was unrelated to alimony, support or maintenance.
Therefore, the debt was property discharged in bankruptcy.
The court of appeal further stated that the husband should
have pursued his rights against his former wife before the bankruptcy court since the bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdic66.
67.
68.
69.

CAL. CIV. CODE § 4380 (West 1983).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128 (West 1982).
Smalley v. Smalley, 176 Cal. App. 2d 374, 375, 1 Cal. Rptr. 440, 442 (1959).
Stout v. Prussel, 691 F.2d 859, 860 (9th Cir. 1982).
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tion to determine the dischargeability of the bankruptcy debt. 70
Section 523(a) of the' Bankruptcy Act71 allows a creditor to exempt from dischargeable debts those debts which were incurred
because of fraud. However, the creditor must request that the
determination of fraud be made. If he fails to act, the debt will
be discharged. In this case, the trial court found that the wife
was guilty of fraud both in the dissolution action and in the
bankruptcy proceeding, where she concealed assets from the
court. However, since the husband did not appear at the bankruptcy proceeding to raise these issues, the bankruptcy court
had no choice but to discharge the debts.
The court of appeal stated that the concept of equitable setoff is well established in the state of California. 72 However, sections 524 73 and 553 7 • of the Bankruptcy Act were interpreted by
the court as prohibiting a state court proceeding from reviving a
debt already discharged in bankruptcy. The court of appeal held
therefore that the lower court erred in granting husband's motion to quash the execution and vacate the levy.
The court next addressed the question of whether the trial
court could modify the property settlement agreement to take
70.
71.
72.
73.

In re Houtman, 568 F.2d 859, 860 (9th Cir. 1982).
11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1982).
3 B. WITKIN. CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE 2552-53 (2d ed. 1971).
11 U.S.C. § 524 (1982).
A discharge in a case under this title (1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such judgment
is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with
respect to any debt discharged under Section 727, 944, 1141,
or 1328 of this title, whether or not discharge of such debt is
waived; (2) operates as an injunction against commencement
of continuation of an action, the debt as a personal liability of
the debtor, or from property of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived . . . .

[d.

74. 11 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
Except as otherwise provided in this section and in sections 362 and 363 of this title, this title does not affect any
right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt owing by such creditor to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the
case under this title against a claim of such creditor against
the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case,
except to the extent that (1) the claim of such creditor against
the debtor is disallowed other than under section 502(b)(3) of
this title . . . .
Id.
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into consideration the wife's discharge of her creditor's debts in
bankruptcy. There were two conflicting policies involved: (1) the
policy of the bankruptcy court to provide a new opportunity in
life for persons, free from all outstanding debts, and (2) the policy of the family law court to require the bankrupt to pay all
outstanding community debts.7~
Civil Code section 4812 was amended in 1977 76 to allow a
court to consider a discharge in bankruptcy when awarding future support. The legislative history of the bill explicitly states
that it was intended to go as far as federal law would permit in
reinstating debts owed to spouses. 77 This, according to the court,
demonstrated that the legislature wanted to redress the inequity
of allowing a spouse, who has an obligation to share community
debts, to discharge those debts in bankruptcy. However, it also
showed, according to the court, that the legislature was aware of
the supremacy of the federal bankruptcy laws and the limits this
placed on the legislature to effect a remedy. The court concluded
that there was nothing in the statute itself or in the legislative
history that indicated that the legislature believed that it could
modify the final property settlement itself notwithstanding the
inequities which otherwise result.
It was clear to the court in this case that the periodic payment of $81.49 due to the wife was not for alimony. The decree
which provided for spousal support terminated in 1978. It was
specifically determined that thirty-six percent of the husband's
retirement fund was community property; the fact that the payments were being made monthly did not change them into alimony or support payments. Since the monthly payment could
not be characterized as alimony, support or maintenance,
neither could it be modified under California Civil Code section
4812 and the rationale of In re Marriage of Clements. 78 Accordingly, the court of appeal ruled that the trial court could not
75. In re Marriage of Clements, 134 Cal. App. 3d 737, 743-44, 184 Cal. Rptr. 756,
759 (1982).
76. CAL. ClV. CODE § 4812 (West 1983) provides that "[i]n the event obligations for
property settlement to a spouse or support of a spouse are discharged in bankruptcy, the
court may make all proper orders for the support of such spouse, as th court may deem
just . . . . " Id.
77. Legal Affairs Department of the Governor's Office Enrolled Bill Report for Assembly Bill No. 1269 (August 11, 1977).
78. 134 Cal. App. 3d 737, 743-46, 184 Cal. Rptr. 756, 759-61 (1982).
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offset a community debt owed by wife to husband against
monthly payments owed to the wife in satisfaction of.her community interest in her husband's retirement income.
In conclusion, the court of appeal held that a wife's debt to
her husband, which arose out of the division of community property unrelated to alimony, support or maintenance, was dischargeable in bankruptcy. The court determined that allowing
the trial court to offset the wife's discharged indebtedness
against payments owed the wife by her husband, would violate
the purpose of the Federal Bankruptcy Act. The court also held
that the California law which permitted a modification of alimony and support payments did not apply to this case since the
payment due to the wife was her share of her husband's retirement fund, which was determined to be community property.
B.

Decedent's Estates
1.

Putative spouse entitled to succeed to share of decedent's separate property.

Estate of Leslie, 37 Cal. 3d 186, 689 P.2d 133, 207 Cal. Rptr.
561 (1984). In Estate of Leslie, the California Suprem~ Court
held that a surviving putative spouse is entitled to succeed to a
share of the decedent's separate property. The court, in reaching
this decision, relied upon previous court of appeal decisions
holding that a surviving putative spouse is entitled to a share of
the decedent's quasi-marital property.79 The court also examined other cases where courts have accorded surviving putative spouses the same rights as surviving legal spouses. The
court concluded that it would lend to anomalous and unjust results to accord surviving putative spouses the same rights as legal spouses in some situations and not to accord a surviving putative spouse a share of the decedent's separate property.
Appellant and decedent were married in Tijuana, Mexico.
Since the marriage was never recorded as required by Mexican
law, the marriage was not valid under Civil Code section 4104. 80
79. Quasi-marital property is property acquired during a putative marriage which
would have been community property if acquired during a valid marriage. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 4452 (West 1983); Estate of Vargas, 36 Cal. App. 3d 714, 717, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779, 780
(1974).
80. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4104 (West 1983) provides that "[a)1I marriages contracted
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Decedent died intestate. Respondent, a son from a previous
marriage, filed a petition for letters of administration, challenging appellant's right to succeed to any of his deceased mother's
separate property. The trial court recognized the existence of a
putative marriage81 between appellant and decedent, but concluded that appellant was not entitled to any of decedent's separate property. He appealed.
Court of appeal decisions have consistently held that a putative spouse is entitled to succeed to quasi-marital property.82
These decisions also strongly suggested that putative spouses are
entitled to a share of their decedent's separate property. In Estate of Krone,83 the court of appeal awarded all of the community estate to a putative spouse and held that the surviving
spouse was entitled to the same share as she would have been as
a legal spouse. Krone has been read to recognize a putative
spouse as the equivalent of a legal spouse for purposes of succession. 84 In other analogous contexts, courts of appeal have afforded surviving putative spouses the same rights as survIvmg
legal spouses. 81i
The California Supreme Court concluded that principles of
fairness mandate that putative spouses be allowed to succeed to
a share of their decedent's separate property. In this case, the
court held that at least one partner held a good faith belief in
without this state, which would be valid by the laws of the jurisdiction in which the same
were contracted, are valid in this state." Id.
81. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4452 (West 1983) states that "[wlhenever a determination is
made that a marriage is void or voidable and the court finds that either party or both
parties believed in good faith that the marriage was valid, the court shall declare such
party or parties to have the status of a putative spouse . . . ." Id.
82. See, e.g., Estate of Krone, 83 Cal. App. 2d 766, 769-70, 189 P.2d 741, 743 (1948);
Estate of Goldberg, 203 Cal. App. 2d 402, 412, 21 Cal. Rptr. 626, 632 (1962).
83. 83 Cal. App. 2d at 769-70, 189 P.2d at 743.
84. Kunakoff v. Woods, 166 Cal. App. 2d 59, 65-66, 332 P.2d 773, 777 (1958).
85. See, e.g., Kunakoff, 166 Cal. App. at 67-68 (surviving putative spouse held to be
an heir for the purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 337 and therefore entitled to
bring an action for wrongful death); Adduddell v. Board of Administration, 8 Cal. App.
3d 243, 249, 87 Cal. Rptr. 268, 271 (1970) (surviving putative spouse held to be a surviving spouse for the purposes of Government Code section 21364 and therefore entitled to
receive special death benefits under the Public Employees' Retirement Law); Brennfleck
v. Workmen's Compo App. Bd., 3 Cal. App. 3d 666, 672, 84 Cal. Rptr. 50, 53 (1979)
(surviving putative spouse held to be a surviving widow for purposes of a former version
of Labor Code section 4702 and was therefore entitled to receive workers' compensation
death benefits).
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the validity of the union. Also, the couple held themselves out to
the community at large as legally married. They lived together
for nearly nine years, and acted for all purposes as husband and
wife. The court concluded that to deny the surviving putative
spouse a share in his wife's separate property while allowing him
to succeed to quasi-marital property made little sense and led to
an unjust result.
The court noted one court of appeal case on point where the
court reached a contrary result. 86 In Estate of Levie, the court
awarded the putative spouse all of the quasi-marital property
but denied her any share of the separate property. In the lower
court, respondent herein relied upon the three reasons given by
the Levie court in support of its holding. First, the court of appeal found no California precedent suggesting that a putative
spouse is entitled to succeed to an interest in the decedent's separate property. Second, it found that the equities which dictated
that quasi-marital property be passed on to a surviving putative
spouse did not exist with regard to separate property; in contrast to quasi-marital property, the combined efforts of the putative spouses did not contribute to the acquisition of separate
property. Third, the court of appeal concluded that giving a surviving putative spouse an interest in decedent's separate property ignored the existing statutory scheme. 87
The California Supreme Court overruled Levie. It found the
court of appeal's reasoning to be wrong and predicted that it
would lead to absurd results. First, as noted herein, the supreme
court cited numerous opinions in support of the proposition that
a putative spouse is entitled to succeed to a share of a decedent's separate property. Second, although it is true that the
combined efforts of putative spouses do not contribute to the
acquisition of separate property, the same is true for legally
married couples. Third, according a surviving putative spouse a
share in the decedent's separate property is consistent with the
statutory scheme. The court reasoned that the rights of a surviving spouse to a decedent's separate property are statutorily created. To acknowledge the same rights on behalf of a putative
spouse merely recognizes that a good faith belief in the marriage
86. Estate of Levie, 50 Cal. App. 3d 572, 576·77, 123 Cal. Rptr. 445, 447 (1975).
87. [d. at 577, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
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should put the surviving putative spouse in the same position as
a surviving legal spouse.
C.

Child Custody and Control
1.

Trial court must find that award of custody of a
child to its natural father would be detrimental to
the child before it may terminate natural father's
custody rights.

In re Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal.
Rptr. 309 (1984). In In re Baby Girl M., the California Supreme
Court held that in a hearing conducted pursuant to Civil Code
section 7017(d)88 to terminate a natural father's89 rights prior to
88. CAL. CIV. CODE § 70I7{d) (West 1983) provides that:
If, after the inquiry, the natural father is identified to the satisfaction of the court, or if more than one man is identified as
a possible father, each shall be given notice of the [adoption)
proceeding . . . . If any of them fails to appear or, if appearing, fails to claim custodial rights, his parental rights with reference to the child shall be terminated. If the natural father or
a man representing himself to be the natural father claims
custodial rights, the court shall proceed to determine parentage and custodial rights in whatever order the court deems
proper. If the court finds that the man representing himself to
be the natural father is a presumed father ... , then the court
shall issue an order providing that the father's consent shall
be required for an adoption of the child. In all other cases, the
court shall issue an order providing that only the mother's
consent shall be required for the adoption of the child.
Id.

89. A natural father is a man who is found to be a child's biological father, but who
has not met the conditions of California Civil Code section 7004 and is therefore not
deemed the child's presumed father. This section provides that:
A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if he
meets the conditions set forth. . . in any of the following subdivisions: (I) He and the child's natural mother are or have
been married to each other and the child is born during the
marriage, or within 300 days after the marriage is terminated
by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce, or
after a decree of separation is entered by a court. (2) Before
the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have attempted to marry each other by a marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with law, although the attempted marriage
is or could be declared invalid, and (i) If the attempted marriage could be declared invalid only by a court, the child is
born during the attempted marriage, or within 300 days after
its termination by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity,
or divorce; or (ii) If the attempted marriage is invalid without
a court order, the child is born within 300 days after the ter-
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the adoption of the child, a determination that award of custody
of the child to its natural father would be detrimental to the
child pursuant to Civil Code section 460090 must be made in order to terminate the natural father's custody rights.
The father and Baby Girl M.'s mother dated for a few
months in 1980. Neither knew she was pregnant when the relationship ended. The child was born July 18, 1981, and was
placed in a foster home three days later. The father never knew
of the pregnancy. He was informed of the birth on August 1,
1981.
The father contacted the Department of Social Welfare, and
on August 5 requested that his daughter be placed with the family then providing day care for his sons. The same day, the
mother formally relinquished the child for adoption, and rejected the father's placement request, stating that she did not
want the child to be placed with any family that the natural parents knew.
A section 7017 petition to terminate the father's parental
rights was filed August 10. The father at that point arranged to
see the child, and on August 17, requested custody. However,
Baby Girl M. was placed with the prospective adoptive parents
on August 24.
At the section 7017(d) hearing, the court found that the father was Baby Girl M.'s biological father, and that he would be
mination of cohabitation. (3) After the child's birth, he and
the child's natural mother have married, or attempted to
marry, each other by a marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with law, although the attempted marriage is or could
be declared invalid, and (i) With his consent, he is named as
the child's father on the child's birth certificate, or (ii) He is
obligated to support the child under a written voluntary
promise or by court order. (4) He receives the child into his
home and openly holds out the child as his natural child.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004 (West 1983).
90. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(c) (West Supp. 1985) provides that:
Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person or persons other than a parent, without the consent of the
parents, it shall make a finding that an award of custody to a
parent would be detrimental to the child and the award to a
nonparent is required to serve the best interests of the child.
[d.
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able to provide a loving home for the child. The ~ourt nevertheless found that it was in the best interests of the child that she
remain with her adoptive parents.
The California Supreme Court held that the appropriate
standard to be used in determining the custodial rights of natural fathers in a section 7017(d) hearing is the "detriment standard" established in section 4600. 91 The court based this conclusion on its analysis of statutory and decisional authority, recent
legislative history, and public policy.
According to the court, section 4600 sets forth a mandate
that custody of a child in a dissolution proceeding may not be
awarded to non parents without the consent of both parents or a
finding that it would be detrimental to the child to award custody to a parent. In In re B.G.,92 in an analysis of the legislative
history of section 4600, the California Supreme Court held that
that section applies to any proceeding in which the custody of a
minor child is at issue. The court stated that since In re B. G.
was decided prior to the enactment of section 7017, the legislature was aware that In re B.G. had extended the section 4600
standard to proceedings outside the Family Law Act. Therefore,
if it had intended that the section 4600 standard not apply in
section 7017(d) hearings, it would have specifically said so.
The court acknowledged that the legislature did pass Assembly Bill 649, which was vetoed by the governor because of
financial provisions it contained. That bill had expressly declared that the provisions of section 4600 would not apply to an
alleged natural father seeking custody in a section 7017(d) hearing. 98 However, when it was reintroduced as Assembly Bill
1782,94 the author agreed to delete that language from the bill.
Thus, the court concluded, the legislature declined an opportunity to disapprove of the application of the section 4600 standard to 7017 hearings.
The court also determined that this decision was consistent
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
11 Cal. 3d 679, 695, 523 P.2d 244, 255, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444, 445 (1974).
A.B. 649 § 6(h) (1983).
A.B. 1782 (1983).
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with public policy as expressed by the Uniform Parentage Act9~
and other relevant California Civil Code sections. California
Civil Code section 19796 establishes that both mothers and presumed fathers must give consent before an adoption can proceed, unless their parental rights have been terminated under a
section 232 97 or section 224 96 hearing. Each parent is equally entitled to the child's custody. If the father is a natural rather than
a presumed father,99 the mother alone is entitled to custody.
Only when the natural mother gives the child up for adoption
are a natural father's rights considered. Pursuant to section
7017(d), he must be notified, and his custodial rights must be
determined before the child may be adopted.
The legislature, through this scheme, differentiates between
the veto powers given unwed mothers, presumed fathers and
natural fathers. The court determined that application of the
detriment standard in a 7017(d) hearing will not defeat this policy. The court disapproved of the language in W.E.J. v. Superior
Court/ oo in which the court of appeal rejected the detriment
standard in such hearings on the ground that its use would be an
automatic veto by the father over the adoption. The California
Supreme Court stated that such a veto will never arise, since the
court may always determine that it would be detrimental to the
child for the father to gain custody. In such cases, the veto
power will never be exercised; the natural father's consent to the
adoption will not be required and the adoption will proceed.
The California Supreme Court concluded that the state
scheme under section 7017(d) satisfies the federal due process
requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard.
The United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the question of whether a natural father's parental
rights require a finding of detriment rather than the less stringent best interests standard. The California Supreme Court
cited with approval a recent law review article in which the au§§ 7000-7021 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985).
§ 197 (West 1982).
§ 232 (West 1982).
§ 224 (West 1982).
99. See supra note 90.
100. 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 309-12, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862, 866-68 (1979).

95.
96.
97.
98.

CAL.
CAL.
CAL.
CAL.

CIY.
CIY.
CIY.
CIY.

CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
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thor proposed that in regard to the constitutional rights of unwed fathers, a state "may not deny biological parents the opportunity to establish a protected custodial relationship."lol Unless
a father voluntarily fails to pursy,e custody, or the child's stepfather voluntarily assumes custody, the natural father's attempt to
gain custody must, in the absence of his unfitness, prevail over
others seeking custody. Therefore, the court stated, the detriment standard is met where the father chooses not to seek custody; the question never arises when there is a stepfather who
assumes custody of the child.
The court recognized that in the case before it, nearly three
years had passed since the original 7017(d) hearing, during
which Baby Girl M. had resided with her adoptive parents.
Therefore, the court reasoned, the trial court might make a finding of detriment to the child which, at the time of the original
hearing, would have been unsupportable. The court directed the
trial court on remand to consider these circumstances when
making its determination.
Justice Mosk, joined by Justice Kaus, issued a strong dissent. He first noted serious omissions in the facts set out by the
majority. For instance, the father on two occasions indicated to
the Social Welfare Department that he did not desire custody.
Further, the mother had agreed to an adoption only if the child
were placed in a stable, two parent home. Justice Mosk contended that the majority's holding will result in a situation in
which many single mothers attempting to place their children in
a stable, two parent home will refuse to relinquish custody
rather than risk the chance of the child being placed with a man
who became the child's father through a casual liaison.
Justice Mosk also found a serious flaw in the legal reasoning
of the majority opinion. He pointed out that the majority simply
ignored the provision of section 7017(d) which provides that "if
the court finds that the man is a presumed father, his consent to
adopt is required; whereas if he is not a presumed father, only
the mother's consent shall be required for the adoption of the
child."
101. Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After
Lehr u. Robertson (1984), 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 313 (1984).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985

37

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 4

612

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:575

Justice Mosk also argued that the clear intention of the legislature was to differentiate between the rights of presumed and
natural fathers. He pointed out that the trial court must make a
determination during the section 7017 proceeding whether a father is presumed or natural; the question of whether the father's
consent to adoption is necessary rests entirely on whether the
father is one or the other. This legislative direction that the natural father's consent is not required is tantamount to saying that
the court need not find detriment in order to free the child for
adoption. Otherwise, there would be no difference between the
presumed and natural father's custodial rights.
Justice Mosk found additional support for his position in
the legislative history of Senate Bill 347,102 which contains the
Uniform Parentage Act. An analysis by the Assembly Judiciary
Committee lOS clearly stated that the bill sought to abrogate any
rights whatsoever unless the father is a presumed father. Otherwise, the mother alone can consent to the child's adoption.
While a natural father must be given notice of an adoption proceeding, and has the right to seek custody, there are absolutely
no standards under which the court would be required to grant
him custody.
Further, Justice Mosk did not believe that the legislative
history after the veto of Assembly Bill 649 indicated that the
legislature did not intend to deprive natural fathers of the parental preference of section 4600; the legislature's intention was
made clear when it enacted Assembly Bill 649. 104 The fact that
an author of a later bill chose to remove the provision is not
indicative of legislative intent as a whole.
Justice Mosk found the cases cited in support of the majority's opinion inapplicable. He contended that the cases cited by
the majority either involved vastly different factual situations,
or were decided prior to the passage of the Uniform Parentage
102. S.B. 347 § 7023(d), as amended May 20, 1975, required that a natural father be
found unfit before the court could dispense with the requirement that he consent to
adoption. The bill was later amended to provide that the only mother's consent is necessary when the father is not classified "presumed." S.B. 347 § 7023(d), as amended Aug.
12, 1975.
103. Assembly Judiciary Committee of Senate Bill No. 347, 1975 Assem. File Analysis, microfiche ed.
104. See supra text accompanying note 93.
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Act.
Finally, Justice Mosk addressed the factor of psychological
harm to a child who has been with adoptive parents all his or
her life. Justice Mosk argued that the majority did not give this
emotional factor sufficient consideration, and that it should have
instructed the trial court to give substantial weight to that
element.
The majority opinion in this case was written by Justice
Sonenshine, on assignment to the California Supreme Court
from the Fourth District Court of Appeal. In a court of appeal
case, Michael U. v. Jamie B.,IOr> Judge Sonenshine wrote an
opinion in which the court awarded custody of a newborn child
to the sixteen-year-old natural father rather than to the prospective adoptive parents. The court of appeal did not find dispositive the facts that the father was sixteen; the mother twelve;
that the father smoked marijuana and had been dropped back at
school; and that an expert witness testified that the child had
developed a strong bond with the adoptive family and would
suffer from the separation. Rather, the court stated that such
considerations do not necessarily mean that the father, while imperfect, would be an unfit parent. l0e Neither was the question of
age dispositive; just as a minor girl may be a parent, so may a
minor boy.
The court of appeal avoided the issue raised by the mother
in In re Michael U. that the decision to give custody to the father had been mistakenly based on the section 4600 standard. 107
The court of appeal allowed the decision to stand, first because
the trial court had not made a statement of decision, and also
because appellant "cannot complain if a higher standard than
necessary was employed to determine whether the father should
be granted custody of the child." IOB Misreading the provisions of
the statute, the court determined that the detriment standard is
used in awarding custody to nonparents, but is irrelevant when
105. 160 Cal. App. 3d 193, 206 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1984), hg. granted Dec. 3, 1984 (L.A.
32014).
106. [d. at 201, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
107. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(c) (West Supp. 1985). For relevant statutory language,
see supra note 90.
108. 160 Cal. App. 3d 193, 199, 206 Cal. Rptr. 323, 327 (1984).
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custody is awarded to the natural father himself. The court
stated that the result in this case is not that the child was removed from an environment in which he was doing well, but
that he was removed from an environment in which he did not
belong. The court of appeal concluded that preadoption placement should not take place until a father's parental rights are
terminated. 109
The In re Michael U. decision awarded custody of a child to
his natural father with no articulated reason and with no discussion of the critical provision of section 7017 that only the
mother's consent to adoption is necessary when the father is not
deemed "presumed." The court disregarded as academic
whether the section 4600 detriment standard is applicable when
custody is awarded to a natural father.

In re Baby Girl M. continued the faulty reasoning. As Justice Mosk clearly explained in his dissent, both the language of
section 7017 and legislative history show that the legislature's
intent was to deny natural fathers such preemptive rights. The
legislature may now respond to the ruling of In re Baby Girl M.
by passing a measure which will protect the decision of the
mother in those situations where the father lacks the type of relationship essential to be considered a "presumed father."
2. Discontinuation of visitation is in best interest of
child where child has been sexually molested by
father.
In re Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789
(2nd Dist. 1984). The court of appeal in In re Cheryl H. held
that there was substantial admissible evidence to support the jurisdictional finding that Cheryl was a dependent of the court
and the dispositional finding that the child's continued contact
with her father was not in her best interest. The court held this
despite ruling the psychiatrist's opinion testimony that the father had sexually abused the child inadmissible hearsay. Finally,
the court held that the trial court had properly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard at both the jurisdictional
and dispositional phases of the dependency hearing.
109. Id. at 201, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
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A petition was filed by the Department of Social Services
seeking to bring Cheryl H. within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court. The petition alleged that Mr. H. (Cheryl's father) sexually
molested Cheryl and that Cheryl was suffering from three hymenal tears in her vagina in addition to other injuries. The lower
court sustained the allegations in the petition. In the jurisdictional phase of the ·dependency hearing, the trial court declared
Cheryl H. a dependent of the juvenile court under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300(a) and (d).llo In the dispositional
phase, the court allowed Cheryl to remain in her mother's home
on the conditions that her father not be allowed to visit Cheryl
and that he begin therapy. Cheryl's father appealed, contending
that (1) the trial court erred by applying the preponderance of
the evidence standard of proof; (2) the judgement was supported
only on the basis of inadmissible hearsay evidence; and (3) the
evidence was insufficient to support the judgment.
The court appointed psychiatrist, Dr. Powell, had offered
opinion testimony that Cheryl had been sexually abused. The
court of appeal held this to be a proper subject for expert testimony. Evidence Code section 801(a)1l1 allows an expert to testify in the form of an opinion if the opinion concerns a subject
sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an
expert would assist the trier of fact. The court determined that
Dr. Powell's education and training had prepared her to draw
inferences and make a diagnosis from observing Cheryl's behavior during play-therapy sessions. The trial court ruled that a lay
person would have difficulty interpreting this data without Dr.
Powell's assistance. This testimony was therefore ruled
admissible.
The court of appeal, however, ruled that the doctor's opinion that Cheryl's father was the person who had sexually abused
Cheryl went far beyond the proper scope of expert witness testimony. Dr. Powell's opinion concerning the identity of the abuser
was necessarily based on the assumption that merely by examin110. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(a) and (d) (West 1984). This statute allows the
juvenile court to adjudge a minor to be a dependent child of the court if (a) the minor
has no parent capable of exercising proper care or control over her or (d) if the home is
unfit due to "neglect, cruelty, depravity, or physical abuse" of the child by a parent or
guardian. [d.
111. CAL. EVID. CODE § SOHa) (West 1966).
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ing a patient, a doctor can make a valid diagnosis and draw valid
conclusions as to the conduct of a third person, in this case
Cheryl's father. The court of appeal reasoned that an expert is
no better equipped than a lay person to make such inferences.
The trier of fact is not assisted by hearing the expert's opinion
and, accordingly, the court determined such testimony to be
inadmissible.
Furthermore, California does not currently have a statutory
hearsay exception for out-of-court statements by victims of child
abuse. ll2 Accordingly, Cheryl's out-of-court statement made during play therapy was inadmissible hearsay. The Evidence
Code1l3 allows opinion testimony concerning the credibility of
hearsay declarants only when the hearsay statement has been
independently admitted under a specific exception to the hearsay rule. Since there was no specific hearsay exception applicable, the court of appeal held that it was improper to admit Dr.
Powell's opinion testimony concerning the credibility of Cheryl's
hearsay statement.
According to the court of appeal, most of the conduct and
statements made by Cheryl about which Dr. Powell testified
would have been independently admissible. The court characterized Cheryl's conduct during play therapy as nonassertive conduct not intended as a substitute for oral or written verbal expression under Evidence Code section 225 114 and therefore not
hearsay under Evidence Code section 1200.llII Cheryl's conduct
112. The Washington Legislature has enacted a special hearsay exception for very
young victims of child abuse which allows into evidence a statement made by a child
under the age of ten describing any act of sexual abuse performed with or on the child. If
the child is unavailable as a witness, the statement can still be admitted into evidence if
there is corroborative evidence of the act. 1982 Wash. Legis. Servo ch. 129 § 2 (West). See
also generally Comment, Child Sexual Abuse in California: Legislative and Judicial
Responses, 15 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 437 (1985). Here, the court of appeal was reluctant to establish such an exception on its own and concluded that the task was better
left to the California Legislature which could then establish appropriate safeguards to
protect the rights of both the child victim and the accused adult abuser.
113. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 780(e) and 1100 (West 1966).
114. CAL. EVID. CODE § 225 (West 1966) which provides that "[sltatement means (a)
oral or written verbal expression or (b) nonverbal conduct of a person intended by him
as a substitute for oral or written verbal expression." Id. (emphasis added). Because
Cheryl had no such intent, her conduct does not fall within the prohibition of the hearsay rule.
115. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200(a) (West 1966). This section provides that hearsay evidence is "evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying
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during play therapy, which consisted of holding the female doll
close to her while rejecting the male doll, orally copulating a
male doll, putting a male doll on top of a female doll, and recoiling at the mention of her father, was determined by the
court to be relevant to prove that Cheryl was molested, as well
as supplying the basis for Dr. Powell's opinion to the same effect. Although Cheryl's out-of-court declarations that her father
had molested her were inadmissible hearsay as to the truth of
the statements, the court ruled that they constituted non-hearsay evidence on the issue of Cheryl's state of mind and were relevant in determining whether continued involvement by the father with Cheryl was desirable.
The court of appeal, relying on Welfare and Institutions
Code section 355, held that at the jurisdictional phase of a dependency hearing, the appropriate standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence.116 However, the court ruled that neither
this section nor section 300117 applied to the dispositional phase
of the hearing. The court reasoned that the appropriate standard of proof for the dispositional phase depends on the particular disposition ordered by the court. Welfare and Institutions
Code section 361(b)116 requires a clear and convincing quantum
of proof only when a child is ordered removed from the custody
of her or his parents.
In this case, the juvenile court ordered that Cheryl remain
with her mother. Therefore, the court of appeal found no compelling reason to require application of a more stringent standard of proof. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence, according to the court, served best to protect the interests of the child
at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated." [d.
116. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355 (West 1984) provides in pertinent part that
"proof by a preponderance of evidence, legally admissible in the trial of civil cases must
be adduced to support a finding that the minor is a person described by Section 300." [d.
117. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West 1984). Subsection (d) of this section provides in pertinent part that:
[a]ny person under the age of 18 years who comes within ...
the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge such person to be a dependent
child of the court: ... [w]hose home is an unfit place for him
by reason of neglect, cruelty, depravity, or physical abuse of
either of his parents ....
[d.

118. CAL. WELF. &

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985

INST.

CODE § 361(b) (West 1984 & Supp. 1985).

43

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 4

618

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:575

and struck an acceptable balance between a safe home for the
child, the interests of the parents in retaining their parental
rights and the interests of the state to protect the child from
parental abuses. The court of appeal concluded that in this case
the trial court correctly determined that its decision to sever the
father's parental rights until his rehabilitation was complete was
supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

3. Application of the term "convicted" as found in
the Civil Code is limited to instances where there
has been a final judgment.
In re Sonia G., 158 Cal. App. 3d 18, 204 Cal. Rptr. 498 (5th
Dist. 1984). The court of appeal in In re Sonia G. held that the
trial court correctly limited the term "convicted" as used in Civil
Code section 232(a)(4)119 to instances where there has been a final judgment. The court of appeal therefore refused to sever the
parental relationship based on this section of the statute. The
court of appeal concluded, however, that the parental relationship was properly severed under section 232 (a)(1)120 and
(a)(2).121
D. is the daughter of Diane R., and Stanley R. Sonia is the
Daughter of Diane R. and her former husband. These minors
119. See infra note 122.
120. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(l) (West 1982) provides:
[A)n action may be brought for the purpose of having any
child under the age of 18 years declared free from the custody
and control of either or both of his or her parents when the
child comes within any of the following descriptions: (1) The
child has been left without provision for the child's identification by his or her parent or parents or by others or has been
left by both of his or her parents or his or her sole parent in
the care and custody of another for a period of six months or
by one parent in the care and custody of the other parent for a
period of one year without communication from the parent or
parents, with the intent on the part of the parent or parents to
abandon the child.
[d.

121. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1985) provides that:
[A child) who has been neglected or cruelly treated by either
or both parents, if the child has been a dependent child of the
juvenile court under any subdivision of Section 300 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code and the parent or parents have
been deprived of the child's custody for one year prior to the
filing of a petition pursuant to this section.
[d.
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were taken into custody by the Kern County Welfare Department (Department) after they reported that they had been sexually abused by Stanley. The Department sought a severance of
the parental relationship on the basis of section 232(a)(4).122 The
trial court refused to grant the severance since Stanley's conviction for child abuse under Penal Code section 288a(c)128 was on
appeal and therefore not final.
The California Supreme Court has held that while an appeal is pending, a lower court judgment of guilty is suspended.
As long as there is a legal possibility of setting aside the lower
court judgment, that judgment is not final. 124
The court of appeal balanced the legislative policy in favor
of a quick resolution of a child's future to provide stability and
security of an adoptive home against the policy of viewing an
involuntary termination of the parent-child relationship by the
state as a drastic remedy to be applied only in extreme situations. The court of appeal held that the trial court correctly applied the clear and convincing standard to the proceeding to determine whether to sever the parental relationship. A judgment
which is not yet final because there is a possibility of its being
overturned on appeal does not satisfy this clear and convincing
test. Therefore, the parental relationship cannot be permanently
severed under California Civil Code section 232(a)(4).
The court of appeal determined, however, that the parental
relationship could be severed under subsections (a)(l) and
(a)(2). These subsections permit the severing of a parental relationship where it is determined that the children have been
abandoned or neglected. The court recognized the risks of delaying the final disposition of cases such as these until the appeal
process has been completed. The court concluded, however, that
in most cases in which a felony conviction for child abuse is being appealed, the facts will warrant the child being declared free
122. This subsection provides that an action may be brought to free a minor child
from the control and custody of his or her parent or parents if that "parent or parents
are convicted of a felony, if the facts of the crime of which the parent or parents were
convicted are of a nature as to prove the unfitness of the parent or parents to have the
future custody and control of the child." CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(4) (West 1982 & Supp.
1985).
123. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288a(c) (West Supp. 1985).
124. Stephens v. Toomey, 51 Cal. 2d 864, 869, 338 P.2d 182, 184-85 (1959).
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from parental custody based on another subsection of section
232.
III.

EMPLOYMENT LAW

A.

Employment Discrimination
1.

Gender is not a bona fide occupational qualification for a position as a cook in a men's jail.

County of Alameda v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission, 153 Cal. App. 3d 499, 200 Cal. Rptr. 381 (lst Dist.
1984). In County of Alameda v. Fair Employment and Housing
Commission the court of appeal applied the Fair Employment
and Housing Act m to a case of race and sex discrimination and
held that a black woman who had been denied employment had
made a prima facie case of race discrimination. The court also
held that the gender based practice of hiring only male cooks for
employment in the men's jail facility was not justified as a bona
fide occupational qualification.
Plaintiff, a black woman, applied for a cook's position with
the Alameda County Sheriff's Department. She had achieved the
highest score on the written examination, had twenty years of
cooking experience, and had placed first on the eligibility list. u6
The white woman hired by the county was clearly less qualified;
she had placed second on the eligibility list and had thirteen
years less cooking experience. It was the first time in nine years
that a job applicant with the highest test score was not hired by
the Alameda County Sheriff's Department. The trial court denied the county's petition to compel the Fair Employment and
Housing Commission (Commission) to reverse its decision that
the county had wrongfully denied employment to plaintiff. The
county appealed.
The court of appeal first examined the issue of racial discrimination. It looked for guidance to cases decided under Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.I27 Although the wording of the
Fair Employment and Housing Act and Title VII of the Federal
125. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(a) (West 1980 & Supp. 1985).
126. Plaintiff testified that during her interview the county's food service manager
told her that he would hire her over the other applicants, but that the final decision was
not his.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(c) (1982).
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Civil Rights Act differ slightly, the anti discriminatory goals and
public policy objectives behind both laws are similar.u8 It is an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to refuse to hire
a person because of such person's color, race, sex, national origin, or religion. 129 For a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case
of racial discrimination under either federal or state law she
must show (1) that she belongs to a racial minority; (2) that she
applied for and was qualified for the job; (3) that she was denied
employment; and (4) that after the denial the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants with similar
qualifications. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the rejection. Finally, the unsuccessful applicant is given the opportunity to
show that the employer's proffered reasons are merely a pretext
to conceal its discriminatory intent. 130
The court in this case held that the plaintiff established a
prima facie case of racial discrimination. The facts easily satisfied the requisite elements: the plaintiff was black and female;
she applied with the county and was well qualified for the job as
cook; she was not hired; and the county continued to interview
prospective employees for the position.
The county argued that the white woman's experience as a
cook for high school students qualified her for the job as a cook
for prison inmates. It also defended its choice to hire her on the
ground that she appeared to be a minority since she had black
facial characteristics. The court rejected the county's reasons for
not hiring the plaintiff, and found that the facts of the case amply supported the Commission's findings that the county's reasons were a mere pretext for its discriminatory hiring practices.
The court next examined the issue of sex discrimination.
The county argued that it was justified in rejecting the plaintiff
for a position in the men's jail faciliaty since Sheriff's Department policy allowed only male cooks to work in the men's jail
128. See Price v. Civil Service Commission, 26 Cal. 3d 257, 271, 276, 604 P.2d 1365,
1373, 1376, 161 Cal. Rptr. 475, 483·84, 487 (1980); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal.
App. 3d 311, 329·30, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927 (1981), citing with approval McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802·07 (1973).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(a)(1) (1982).
130. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,.803·04 (1973).
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facility. The county reasoned that gender is a bona fide occupational qualification because the presence of a female cook would
violate the inmate's right to privacy and would threaten
security.
A gender-based classification is permitted only if it is a
bona fide occupational qualification necessary to the normal operation of the place of employment. lSI In Dothard v. Rawlinson,lS2 a leading United States Supreme Court case on genderbased classification, the Court held that in situations where a
woman would have extensive physical or isolated contact with
the inmates, she may properly be excluded from working as a
prison guard. ISS In Long v. State Personnel Board,ls4 a California court of appeal upheld a lower court's denial of employment
as a prison chaplain to a woman applicant. The Long court reasoned that the extensive isolated contact betwe~n the chaplain
and the inmates might result in a sexual attack upon the female
employee. ls6
The court in Alameda noted that Dothard has been limited
to the particular setting in which there is a very high risk of
harm to female employees. lSG The Alameda court compared the
factual setting in Dothard to the case at hand. The cook's position in the men's facility did not require a threatening proximity
to the inmates. In contrast, a guard works inside dormitories
which house large groups of inmates.
The court next rejected the county's argument that the
male prisoner's privacy interests would be violated by the presence of a woman. The court followed Smith v. Fairman,137 a federal court of appeals case, which held that government agencies,
except in extreme circumstances, must make suitable accommodations where the privacy interests of the prison population conflict with the applicant's right to obtain a job. The court reasoned that female attorneys, psychologists, and others visited
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

42 u.S.C. § 2000e2(e) (1982).
433 u.S. 321 (1971).
Id. at 336.
41 Cal. App. 3d 1000, 116 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1974).
Id. at 1016-18, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 573-75.
S~ith v. Fai~man, 678 F.2d 52, 54 (7th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 55.
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the jail without prisoners suffering any significant loss of privacy. Additionally, the court determined that the structure of
the jail insured that the inmate's privacy would not be affected,
and, in any event, if a woman cook's presence posed a threat to
inmate privacy then structural modifications could easily be
made.
The court of appeal upheld a Fair Employment and Housing Commission's decision that a black woman had suffered race
and sex discrimination by the County of Alameda. In doing so,
the court made it clear that gender is a bona fide occupational
qualification for employment in men's prisons only when the position would subject the woman to a high risk of harm.
B.

Unemployment Insurance
1.

Employee who accompanies "non-marital partner"
voluntarily leaves work with good cause within the
meaning of the statute governing eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits.

MacGregor v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 37 Cal. 3d
205, 689 P.2d 453, 207 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1984). In MacGregor v.
Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., the California Supreme Court
held that a worker who left her job to accompany her "non-marital partner" to another state in order to maintain the familial
relationship they had established with their child, voluntarily
left work with good cause within the meaning of the statute governing eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits. l38 The
court determined that the absence of a marital relationship is
not a bar to the recovery of unemployment benefits when other
compelling circumstances are established. The court stated that
the preservation of the family unit is sufficient to establish the
compelling circumstances necessary to constitute good cause
under the statute.
Plaintiff lived with her non-marital partner for two years
during which they had one child. Due to his father's bad health,
the plaintiff's non-marital partner decided to move the family to
New York. Plaintiff quit her job to stay with her family. The
California Development Department (Department) determined
138. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256 (West 1972).
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that she had quit voluntarily without good cause and was therefore ineligible for benefits. This decision was upheld on appeal
both by an administrative law judge in New York and by the
California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (Board).
The superior court, pursuant to a writ of mandate sought by
plaintiff, reversed and the Board appealed.
Under Unemployment Insurance Code section 1256,139 an
individual is ineligible for unemployment compensation if he or
she left work voluntarily without good cause. The California Supreme Court in Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd.14°
held that the claimant who left her place of employment in order to preserve her relationship with a man she planned to
marry did not establish good cause within the meaning of the
statute. HI The Norman court, however, indicated that its decision did not necessarily preclude the possibility of finding sufficiently compelling circumstances to constitute good cause in a
non-marital relationship.l'2 The Norman court even foresaw the
situation which arose in MacGregor and stated that where there
were children present in a non-marital relationship, good cause
might be shown. HS
In this case, the California Supreme Court concluded that
the existence of a legal marriage is not the exclusive means of
showing good cause based on compelling family circumstances.
The Board and the administrative law judge had rested their decisions solely on the lack of a legally recognized marriage and
dismissed even the possibility that any other relationship could
establish good cause based upon compelling family circumstances. The supreme court, however, upheld the trial dourt's
finding that the plaintiff had indeed established a family unit
which consisted of herself, her partner and their child, and that
the decision to move to New York was made to preserve the
family unit.
The supreme court also rejected the Board's policy argument for not recognizing good cause based on compelling family
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

[d.
34 Cal. 3d 1, 663 P.2d 904, 192 Cal. Rptr. 134 (1983).
[d. at 9, 663 P.2d at 909, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
[d. at 10, 663 P.2d at 910, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
[d.
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circumstances in non-marital family couples. The Board maintained that its rule was consistent with the public policy of
favoring marriage and of affording special benefits and protections to that institution. The supreme court pointed out that the
policy of maintaining secure and stable relationships between
parents and children is an equally strong policy consideration.
This policy is codified in Civil Code section 7002 144 and in the
conciliation statutes relied upon by the Board,1411 in which the
legislature explicitly recognized that the parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents.
The aspect of the court's decision which is the most troublesome is the apparent narrowness of its application. The court's
decision strikes a balance between countervailing policies, where
the importance of the family unit rivals even that of the marriage institution. There are other situations, however, such as
gay and unwed couples without children, where compelling circumstances might warrant an award of unemployment compensation when one partner leaves work in order to remain with the
other. The enlightened and reality-based reasoning which guided
the MacGregor decision has yet to be applied to such non-traditional families.
C.

Wrongful Discharge
1.

Woman wrongfully discharged for dating employee
of her employer's competitor.

Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 524 (1st Dist. 1984). In Rulon-Miller, the court of appeal
upheld a judgment for compensatory and punitive damages on
claims of wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court upheld the award of punitive damages
on the grounds that statements made when the plaintiff was discharged implied that she could not act or think for herself, and
144. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7002 (West 1983) provides that "[tJhe parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and every parent, regardless of the marital status
of the parents." [d.
145. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1730 (West 1982) provides that "[tJhe purposes of this
chapter are to protect the rights of children and to promote the public welfare by preserving, promoting, and protecting family life and the institution of matrimony, and to
provide means for the reconciliation of spouses and the amicable settlement of domestic
and family controversies." [d.
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that the management was acting in her best interests. The court
of appeal found that such statements tended to humiliate and
degrade the plaintiff, and emphasized her powerlessness to assert her rights as an employee, which the court determined to be
one of the most debilitating kinds of oppression.
The plaintiff had worked her way up from sales to management at IBM. She had consistently received awards and the
highest possible performance ratings for her work. One week
before her discharge, she had received a $4,000 merit raise.
The plaintiff was dating a man who had previously worked
for IBM, but had left to work for a competitor. It was widely
known at IBM that he and the plaintiff were dating. No one had
raised the issue of the relqtionship when the plaintiff was promoted to management.
One week after receiving her merit raise, plaintiff was told
that her relationship constituted a "conflict of interest" and that
she had to end the relationship or lose her job. She was given a
few days to a week to think it over. However, the next day she
was told that the decision had been made for her. When the
plaintiff objected, she was dismissed.
The court of appeal upheld the plaintiff's claim of wrongful
discharge on the ground that existing IBM policies guaranteed
the plaintiff the right to privacy in her personal life. The court
determined that company action contrary to those policies constituted a violation of the plaintiff's employment contract rights.
The court noted that the common law rule that an employment contract of indefinite duration is generally terminable at
will by either party, as codified in Labor Code section 2922,146
was modified by the California Supreme Court's recognition of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in
such contracts. U7 In this case, the employee's right to be dealt
with fairly was "at least the right of an employee to the benefit
of the rules and regulations adopted for his or her protection."
Those IBM rules specifically stated that an employee's private
146. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1971 & Supp. 1985).
147. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 178, 6lO P.2d 1330, 1336-37,
164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 846 (1980).
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life was of no concern to the company unless it interfered with
his or her job performance, the performance of others, or affected the reputation of the company in a major way. The IBM
rules also indicated that a charge of "conflict of interest" could
be based only on moonlighting or solicitation of clients, not on
romantic relationships.
The court of appeal also rejected the defendant's contention
that the jury had been inadequately instructed on the standard
to be used in determining whether IBM had acted in good faith
in disc~arging Rulon-Miller. The trial court gave the jury seven
factors to take into consideration including: (1) whether the employee was discharged for legitimate business and employment
reasons; (2) whether the employee was discharged on a pretext;
(3) whether the employee was engaged in a sensitive or confidential management position; (4) whether the employee had a conflict of interest; (5) whether the employee's relationship endangered the employer's legitimate business interests; (6) whether
the employer infringed upon the employee's personal privacy;
and (7) whether the employee was discriminated against because
of the employee's sex.
Finally, the court of appeal upheld the award of punitive
damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. That the
plaintiff's manager's conduct could be termed "extreme, outrageous, and atrocious" was confirmed by examination of the circumstances surrounding the employer's invasion of the plaintiff's privacy. The court found a decided element of deception,
since the manager had pretended that the plaintiff's relationship
was something new. In addition, the manager acted in flagrant
disregard of company policy. The court found this conduct to be
unfair, but not atrocious. What made the conduct subject to punitive damages was the manner in which the manager brought
these elements together by his statement that he was making
the decision for the plaintiff. The court called the implications
of this statement "richly ambiguous," perhaps meaning that the
manager believed that the plaintiff could not act or think for
herself, or that the manager was acting in her best interest.
The court determined that the combination of statements
and conduct tended to humiliate and degrade the plaintiff. The
court stated that denial of rights which were guaranteed under
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company policies and granted to all other employees degraded
her as a person. By denying the plaintiff the right to choose between work and her relationship, the manager intended to emphasize her powerlessness to assert her employment rights. The
court called such powerlessness "one of the most debilitating
kinds of human oppression." Such conduct on the part of the
manager amply supported the punitive damages award.
The language of the court in this case is potentially valuable
to women plaintiffs who seek punitive damages in a wrongful
discharge suit. The actions which the court describes as extreme
and outrageous in this case-emphasizing the plaintiff's
powerlessness and inability to make a decision-can often be
ascribed to traditional attitudes of male management toward female employees.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A. Equal Protection
1.

A difference in rights accorded to mothers and
nonpresumed fathers does not violate the equal
protection clause of the California or United
States Constitutions.

People v. Carrillo, 162 Cal. App. 3d 585, 208 Cal. Rptr. 684
(1st Dist. 1984). In People v. Carrillo, the court of appeal held
that the difference in the rights granted to mothers and nonpresumed fathers by Civil Code section 197 U8 does not infringe
upon a father's right to equal protection of the laws under the
California or United States Constitutions. Therefore, the court
concluded, there is no constitutional reason for not prosecuting a
father for child stealing under California Penal Code section
278. U9

Alexandra M. believed that appellant Victor Carrillo was
148. CAL. CIV. ConE § 197 (West 1982) provides in pertinent part: "The mother of an
unmarried child is entitled to its custody, services and earnings. The father of the child,
if presumed to be the father under subdivision (a) of Section 7004, is equally entitled to
the custody, services and earnings of the unmarried minor .... " Id.
149. CAL. PENAL ConE § 278 (West Supp. 1985) provides that: "Every person, not
having a right of custody, who maliciously takes, detains, conceals, or entices away, any
minor child with intent to detain or conceal that child from 8 person, guardian, or public
agency having the lawful charge of the child shall be punished ...." Id.
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the father of her child and initiated an action to name him as
the father. After informing Victor that she was pregnant and
thought him to be the child's father, Alexandra did· not hear
from him until the child was six months old, the day Victor took
a court ordered blood test. The test showed a 99.94 likelihood
that Victor was the father of the child. Around the time of the
blood test, Victor and his wife Margaret took the child from her
mother. Alexandra did not see her child until six months later.
The trial court found that Victor was not a "presumed father" under Civil Code section 7004 m and therefore Victor had
no right to custody under Civil Code section 197. 1IH Consequently the court of appeal held that Victor could be prosecuted
for child stealing under Penal Code section 278. 1112 Victor appealed contending that Penal Code section 278 as applied to him
in this case was unconstitutional.
California Civil Code section 197 provides that absent a
court order, both the natural mother and the man presumed to
be the natural father of a child pursuant to Civil Code section
7004 are entitled to the custody, services and earnings of an unmarried minor. Penal Code section 278 makes it a crime for a
person "not having the right of custody" of a child to take, entice away, detain or conceal the child from his or her parent or a
person with lawful custody.1II3
The court of appeal noted that section 197 operates to deny
a non presumed father custody rights in the child which are
granted to the mother. Whether this deprivation violates the
equal protection clause depends upon whether the mother and
alleged natural father are similarly situated with respect to the
child. 11I4 Those statutes which limit the rights of the natural fa150. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004 (West 1983). For relevant statutory language, see supra
note 89.
151. CAL. CIV. CODE § 197 (West 1982). For relevant statutory language, see supra
note 148.
152. CAL. PENAL CODE § 278 (West Supp. 1985). For relevant statutory language, see
supra note 149.
153. C{. Wilborn v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 828, 830, 337 P.2d 65, 66 (1959), in
which the California Supreme Court held that in the absence of a custody order, a parent with the right of custody does not commit child stealing by taking exclusive possession of the child.
154. Lehr v. Robinson, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246
(1978); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
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ther vis-a-vis those of the mother regardless of whether he had
established significant custodial, personal or financial relationships with the child, have been found unconstitutional, while
statutes which made such a distinction have been upheld. m
California cases considering Civil Code section 197 in the
context of adoption UI6 have generally held that the statutory
scheme satisfies both California and federal constitutions since
it allows an alleged natural father to attempt to establish the
existence of a relationship pursuant to Civil Code section 7006 1117
and an opportunity to qualify as a presumed father under section 7004. Here, the court observed that the statutes at issue do
not create irrebuttable presumptions or make it impossible for a
non presumed natural father to obtain custody rights in his child.
The court referred to recent court of appeal decisions 16s which
have held that a non presumed natural father is still entitled to
the benefit of the parental preference doctrine unless countervailing policy interests prevail.
The court in Carrillo found sufficient countervailing policy
reasons not to protect the natural father's interest. The father
was not challenging the constitutionality of sections 197 of the
155. Compare Lehr v. Robinson, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983) and Quilloin v. Walcott, 434
U.S. 246 (1978) with Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
156. See, e.g., In re Tricia M., 74 Cal. App. 3d 125, 132-35, 141 Cal. Rptr. 554, 55861 (1977); Adoption of Rebecca B., 68 Cal. App. 3d 193, 198, 137 Cal. Rptr. 100, 103
(1977).
157. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7006 (West 1983) provides in pertinent part:
An action to determine the existence of the father and child
relationship with respect to a child who has no presumed father under Section 7004 or whose presumed father is deceased
may be brought by ... a man alleged or alleging himself to be
the father, or the personal representative or a parent of the
alleged father if the alleged father has died or is a minor. The
commencement of such an action shall suspend any pending
proceeding in connection with the adoption of such child, including a proceeding pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section
7017, until a judgment in the action is final.
Id.
158. In re Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984) and
Adoption of Baby Boy D., 159 Cal. App. 3d 8, 205 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1984) have both held
that due process and equal protection of the laws demand that a natural father's rights
not be terminated nor custody of his child awarded to a non parent except upon a finding
that award of custody to the natural father would be detrimental to the child. See supra
text accompanying notes 89-109 for further discussion of the rights of nonpresumed natural fathers.
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Civil Code and 278 of the Penal Code in order to obtain legal
custody of his child. He was making his claim as a defense to a
criminal conviction of child stealing. It was, therefore, solely in
his own interest as opposed to that of his daughter's that he
made his constitutional claim. Victor had never followed any of
the procedures provided by statute to establish paternity or provide any assistance, financial or otherwise, to mother or child.
The court of appeal concluded that due to the patently different nature of their respective relationships to their child, the
natural mother and the non presumed natural father were not
similarly situated. The mother provided and would continue to
provide all the care for the child, while the father went so far as
to deny paternity until the court ordered him to submit to a
blood test. Due to appellant's failure to establish any paternal
relationship with the child, the court of appeal held that the difference in rights accorded to mothers and nonpresumed fathers
under the Civil Code did not violate Victor's constitutional
rights as applied in this case. Therefore the court found no reason that Victor should not have been prosecuted under Penal
Code section 287.
Alan Black*
Katherine Hardy**
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